

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8398

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MANILA 18682

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECDEF, JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF,
CINCPACREPPHIL SUBIC, 13TH AF CLARK

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, RP
SUBJECT: BASE ISSUES: THIRD MEETING WITH MARCOS

REFS: (A) STATE 263594, (B) STATE 264328, (C) STATE 262931
(D) MANILA 18115, (E) MANILA 18104, (F) STATE 274303
(G) MANILA 18181, (H) STATE 280964

1. SUMMARY.

NOVEMBER 25 BRIEFING AT GHQ, TOTALLING
ABOUT 90 MINUTES, COMPRISED THRID SESSION WITH MARCOS ON
BASE ISSUES AND FOLLOWED PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN MARCOS
AND AMBASSADOR, BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY. MARCOS
OPENED BRIEFING WITH AN ASSESSMENT OF THE THREATS THE
GOP BELIEVES MAY DEVELOP IN THE REGION OVER THE COMING
YEARS. FOCUS WAS ON A VIETNAM WHICH MAY BE "PREDATORY"
BY 1982; ON A POTENTIAL EVOLUTION OF COMMUNIST INSURGENT
PRESSURE WHICH COULD PENETRATE THAILAND, MALAYSIA,
SINGAPORE AND INDONESIA, EVENTUALLY POSING A THREAT ON
THE PHILIPPINES SOUTHERN FLW(; ON A TAIWAN WICH COULD
BECOME A PRC PROVINCE AND A POTENTIAL THREAT; ON A
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UNION IN THE PHILIPPINES BETWEEN THE CPP/NPA AND THE MNLF
WHICH COULD BRING GREATER SUPPORT FROM THE PRC AND THE
USSR. MARCOS STRESSED THAT GOP WILL ALONE MEET ALL
THREATS TO INTERNAL STABILITY AND WOULD NOT CALL UPON
US FOR HELP UNLESS THERE WERE MASSIVE INFILTRATION OF
"FOREIGN ARMIES, TRAINED PERSONNEL OR FOREIGN TROOPS."
ESPINO WENT ON TO COVER THE SAME GROUND IN MORE DETIAL

AND THEN LED INTO AN AFP BRIEFING SEEN OCTOBER 18 ON MINDANAO, THE NPA, AFP MODERNIZATION PLANS, ETC. PLEASANT ADDITION TO LATTER ELEMENT WAS ESPINO'S EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR USG EFFORTS TO EXPEDITE DELIVERY OF REQUIRED ITEMS IN THE PAM AND FMS PIPELINES. MARCOS ANNOUNCED AT CLOSE OF BRIEFING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PUBLICITY. END SUMMARY.

2. MARCOS ON SECURITY SETTING. MARCOS OPENED MEETING (FULL STAFF ON BOTH SIDES) BY NOTING THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER OFFERED TO ASSIST GOP SELF-RELIANCE OBJECTIVES. IN THAT LIGHT, MARCOS HAD ASKED THAT AN AFP BRIEFING BE PREPARED ON THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION. READING FROM A PREPARED BRIEFING, HE SAID THE FOCUS WAS ON ASIA, ESPECIALLY SOUTHEAST ASIA, WITH A VIEW TO DETERMINING HOW THE EVOLVING SITUATION MIGHT AFFECT PRESENT AND FUTURE PHILIPPINE SECURITY. HE SAID THE TWO CURRENT SECURITY PROBLEMS FOR THE PHILIPPINES ARE THE MNLF "SECESSIONISTS, SUPPORTED BY LIBYA", AND THE NPA COMMUNISTS, WHO ARE ALSO SUPPORTED FROM ABROAD (PRC). HE SAID THERE IS INTELLIGENCE THAT THESE TWO ELEMENTS (NPA AND MNLF) HAVE AGREED TO UNIFY IN THEIR EFFORTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. MARCOS NOTED THAT PRC AND USSR LEADERS HAVE STATED IN THE PAST THEY WOULD NOT SUPPORT EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT BUT SAID THERE HAS BEEN SUPPORT AND THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT
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IT WILL CONTINUE. MARCOS WENT ON TO SAY THAT LIBYA HAS, IN THE PAST, HELPED THE MNLF AND THAT HE COULD NOT DISCOUNT THE PROSPECT OF RESUMED SUPPORT. HE SAID THAT THE USSR, THROUGH ITS CONTACTS WITH LIBYA, MAY BE BEHIND IT. MARCOS SAID THAT THERE IS THE DANGER THAT ASSISTANCE THROUGH THIS CHANNEL MAY INCREASE IF THE COMMUNISTS AND THE MNLF JOIN FORCES. HE SAID THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF A "VIETNAM-TYPE EXPORTED WAR." MARCOS REFERRED TO THE WIDELY HELD VIEW THAT THE PRC AND THE USSR CANNOT GET TOGETHER BECAUSE OF SERIOUS DIFFERENCES. HE SAID THAT THE GOP DOES NOT COMPLETELY ACCEPT THIS ASSESSMENT, BECAUSE OF FEAR THAT THOSE TWO POWERS "MIGHT WORK TOGETHER AGAINST A COUNTRY AND THEN LATER FIGHT OVER THE SPOILS." MARCOS REFERRED TO VIETNAM AS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS. HE WENT ON TO DISCUSS VIETNAM IN MORE DETAIL, NOTING THAT

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 MANILA 18682

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DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECDEF, JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF,
CINCPACREPPHIL SUBIC, 13TH AF CLARK

THERE IS A STANDARD VIEW AMONG LEADERS OF THE REGION
THAT THERE WILL BE A MORE "PREDATORY VIETNAM" BY 1982
("7 YEARS AFTER THE FALL IN 1975"). IN THIS LIGHT,
MARCOS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THERE WILL BE GROWING
PRESSURES ON THAILAND, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE. MARCOS
THEN SHIFTED TO THE PRC, NOTING THAT TAIWAN MAY EVENTUALLY
BECOME A PRC PROVINCE, A POTENTIAL PROBLEM SINCE TAIWAN
IS ONLY 90 MILES NORTH OF PHILIPPINE TERRITORY (REMOTE
OFFSHORE ISLAND). HE SAID THAT WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR
A PRC CONTROLLED TAIWAN AND THE PROSPECT OF COMMUNIST
PRESSURE IN MINADANO, THE PHILIPPINES MAY BE IN THE
MIDDLE OF A "GIANT NUTCRACKER." MARCOS WENT ON TO
NOTE THAT JAPAN'S VITAL SEA LANES FOR OIL PASS THROUGH
THE REGION, NOTING CRYPTICALLY THAT SOME JAPANESE YOUTH
WANT TO REARM AND THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE OLD
IDEA OF A CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE MIGHT REEMERGE. MARCOS
SAID THE PHILIPPINES IS PRIMARILY CONCERNED NOW ABOUT
INTERNAL REBELLION. HE STRESSED THAT THE PHILIPPINES
WILL ALONE MEET ALL THREATS TO INTERNAL STABILITY AND
THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES
UNLESS THERE IS MASSIVE INFILTRATION OF "FOREIGN ARMS,
TRAINED PERSONNEL OR FOREIGN TROOPS." HE SAID, HOWEVER,
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THAT ON THE QUESTION OF EXTERNAL AGGRESSION, THE
PHILIPPINES MUST BEAR IN MIND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL
PRECEPTS AND BE PREPARED TO DEFEND ITSELF DURING THAT
PERIOD IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO

COME TO ITS SUPPORT. MARCOS THEN ASKED GENERAL ESPINO TO CONTINUE IN MORE DETAIL.

3. ESPINO BRIEFING. ESPINO SAID THAT AFP PLANNING IS BASED ON TWO PREMISES: 1) TO MEET INCREASED INSURGENCY THREATS WITHOUT INVOLVING THE U.S.; AND 2) Z MAKE A TIMELY RESPONSE TO ANY OVERT AGGRESSION. REGARDING THE FIRST POINT, ESPINO NOTED THAT LIBYAN AMBASSADOR DREIZA RECENTLY ASKED HIS GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT TO THE MNLF. ON THE SECOND POINT, ESPINO EXPRESSED GOP CONCERN THAT THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS WOULD PRECLUDE RAPID U.S. RESPONSE TO EXTERNAL ATTACK ON THE PHILIPPINES. ESPINO SAID THAT THE PRC AND THE USSR ARE THREATS TO THE PHILIPPINES BECAUSE THEY ARE EXPORTERS OF INSURGENCIES. HE REFERRED TO THE "LESSON OF VIETNAM." ESPINO SAID THAT THE AFP SEES THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS IMPORTANT: 1) HOW WILL THAILAND HOLD UP UNDER CURRENT PRESSURES AND WHAT HAPPENS IF IT FALLS TO THE COMMUNISTS? 2) IF THAILAND FALLS, WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO MALAYSIA? 3) AFTER MALAYSIA WOULD THE PRESSURES THEN RISE AGAINST SINGAPORE AND INDONESIA? 4) FINALLY, WHAT WOULD THE PHILIPPINES DO WITH A COMMUNIST PRESENCE ON ITS SOUTHERN APPROACHES? SHIFTING TO THE NORTH ESPINO NOTED THAT IF TAIWAN BECOMES A PROVINCE OF THE PRC, AS EXPECTED, THE PHILIPPINES WILL BE POTENTIALLY IN THE GRIP OF A COMMUNIST Pincer. ESPINO ASKED WHAT JAPAN MIGHT DO IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES TO PROTECT ITS OIL LINES. ESPINO THEN WENT ON TO PROVIDE A FAMILIAR REVIEW OF THE MUSLIM SITUATION. HE DID POINT UP THAT SABAH REMAINS
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IMPORTANT TO THE MNLF AS A COMMAND POST, LOGISTICAL BASE, SANCTUARY AND COMMUNICATIONS ROUTE. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT THE AFP COULD DO IF LIBYA WERE TO PROVIDE MORE SUPPORT TO THE MNLF THROUGH SABAH.

ESPINO REVIEWED THE CPP/NPA PROBLEM, BREAKING LITTLE NEW GROUND. HE SOUGHT TO DEMONSTRATE A GROWING RELATIONSHI BETWEEN THE NPA DN THE MNLF, NOTING THAT THE MNLF HAS PROVIDED ARMS TO THE NPA IN EXCHANGE FOR FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES; THAT CAPTURED MNLF DOCUMENTS SHOW A MAOIST ORIENTATION; AND THAT THE CPP WROTE THE MNLF ASKING CLOSER COOPERATION. ESPINO WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE RELIGIOUS RADICALS AND THE RIGHTISTS AS ELEMENTS SUSCEPTIBLE TO PROMOTING COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES. NOTING THAT THE CHURCH REMAINS A POTENTIAL BASE FOR SUBVERSION, ESPINO REFERRED TO THE CASE OF FATHER DE LA TORRE, "WHO CONFESSED THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN A COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATION." HE ADDED THAT RECENTLY CAPTURED CPP/NPA CHIEF SISON WAS USING A CAR REGISTERED TO THE CARMELITE

MOVEMENT.

4. AFP OPERATIONS ANBHMODERNIZATION PLANS. ESPINO DESCRIBED CURRENT AFP OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, HIGH-

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 MANILA 18682

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECDEF, JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF,
CINCPACREPPHIL SUBIC, 13TH AF CLARK

LIGHTING DEFICIENCIES IN AIR AND GROUND MOBILITY, COMMUNICATIONS AND FIRE POWER. ESPINO IMPLIED THAT THE ARMY WILL HAVE SUBSTANTIAL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH PLANNED EXPANSION N INFANTRY, PC AND PARAMILITARY FORCES. AIR FORCE PLANS CALL FOR AN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM, ALL WEATHER JET INTERCEPTORS, COMPLETE RADAR COVERAGE FOR THE COUNTRY, SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES, MORE STRIKE AIRCRAFT AND MORE AIRLIFT CAPABILITY. ESPINO SAID THE NAVY NEEDS MORE SHIPS AND CRAFT TO SUPPORT GROUND OPERATIONS, TO COUNTER INFILTRATION, AND TO PROVIDE SEA LIFT AND FLEET SUPPORT. HE SAID THERE ARE OVERALL AFP REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS AND MORE SELF-RELIANCE PRODUCTION PROJECTS.

5. OUR RESPONSE TO BRIEFINGS: THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THE BRIEFINGS AND FOR THE PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT OF MARCOS. DESCRIBING HIS COMMENTS AS PRELIMINARY, THE AMBASSADOR RECOGNIZED THAT THERE IS AN INTERNAL THREAT IN THE PHILIPPINES AND TOOK NOTE OF THE ASSERTIONS OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE GOP COMMITMENT NOT TO INVOLVE THE U.S. IN INTERNAL INSURGENCIES AND SAID THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO
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EXAMINE PHILIPPINE SPECIFIC PRIORITY LISTS OF EQUIPMENT FOR LONG-TERM EXTERNAL DEFENSE. HE NOTED, IN PASSING THAT ANY ASSISTANCE WE PROVIDE FOR EXTERNAL DEFENSE MIGHT FREE GOP BUDGET MONEY FOR APPLICATION TO INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS. HE OBSERVED THAT THERE IS NO LACK OF SYMPATHY FOR INTERNAL PROBLEMS, POINTING OUT OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO EXPEDITE DELIVERIES OF ITEMS IN THE MAP AND FMS SYSTEM, BUT STRESSED THAT U.S. ATTENTION WILL BE DIRECTED TO PHILIPPINE EXTERNAL DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE BRIEFING ON THE REGIONAL SECURITY SCENE WILL REQUIRE CAREFUL STUDY AND PROMISED TO RESPOND IN THE COURSE OF OUR CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS. ON THE MDT, THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO BE PREPARED TO RESPOND AS REQUIRED UNDER THAT TREATY BECAUSE THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION ALLOWS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF TO ACT PROMPTLY, WITH SUBSEQUENT NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS. HE MENTIONED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S TOP EXPERT ON THE SUBJECT HAD BRIEFED ENRILE IN NEW YORK. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED TWO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BRIEFINGS. FIRST, HE REQUESTED MORE ANALYSIS OF THE EXPRESSED EXPECTATIONS OF A "PREDATORY VIETNAM BY 1982." HE ALSO ASKED FOR A MORE DETIALED INDICATION OF GOP VIEWS OF THE SITUATION IN ASEAN. HE REFERRED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO EAST MALAYSIA AND ASKED WHETHER THE GOP SEES PROSPECTS FOR LONG-TERM INSECURITY IN THAT AREA. (THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE SENSITIVITY OF QUESTIONS ABOUT ASEAN NEIGHBORS). ON THE QUESTION OF THE LIST OF AFP EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS, THE AMBASSAODR SAID THAT WE WOULD BE STANDING BY TO EXAMINE IT AS SOON AS IT IS READY. HE SAID THAT WHEN WE HAVE THE LIST, A DEFENSE SURVEY TEAM WILL BE PREPARED TO COME TO MANILA TO EXAMINE IT IN DETAIL. MARCOS REPLIED PARTIALLY TO THE AMBASSADOR'S

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QUESTION ON VIETNAM, NOTING THAT LEADERS IN THE REGION BELIEVE THAT BY 1982 VIETNAM WILL HAVE EITHER BUILT ITS ECONOMY OR FAILED TO DO SO AND THAT IT WILL BY THAT TIME HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO WITH ITS LARGE ARMED FORCES. MARCOS SAID THAT THERE IS THE FURTHER VIEW THAT VIENAM WILL NOT KEEP ITS HANDS OFF THAILAND, COUPLED WITH THE PROSPECT THAT THE USSR AND PRC MAY CONCERT TO PULL DOWN THAILAND. MARCOS SAID THERE IS ALSO THE PROSPECT OF VIETNAM SHIPPING ARMS TO THE OTHER COUNTRIES. HE SAID MALAYSIA HAS REPORTED THE TRANSFER OF "SOME KIND OF

VIETNAMESE EQUIPMENT" TO COMMUNIST INSURGENTS IN MALAYSIA. MARCOS NOTED THAT THAILAND HAD IN THE PAST CHARGED THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE SHIPPING IN ARMS. MARCOS SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE A FULLER REPLY LATER ON THE QUESTION OF VIETNAM. CONTINUING ON THAILAND, MARCOS SAID THAT THE NEW LEADERS MAY BE MORE INTERESTED IN ACCOMMODATING THE COMMUNISTS THAN THANIN WAS. HE OBSERVED THAT THAILAND IS KNOWN FOR ACCOMMODATION. TURNING TO MALAYSIA, MARCOS SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS SO PREOCCUPIED WITH ITS SECURITY PROBLEMS THAT IT DOES NOTHING ABOUT TRANSHIPMENTS TO THE MNLF THROUGH SABAH. MARCOS SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GOM ENDORSES

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 MANILA 18682

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (T E X T)

DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECDEF, JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF,
CINCPACREPPHIL SUBIC, 13TH AF CLARK

THIS BUT IS JUST NOT IN A POSITION TO DO MUCH ABOUT IT.

6. ALLEGED LOSSES OF U.S. ARMS AT BASES. ENRILE SAID HE HAD REPORTS THAT U.S. ARMS HAVE BEEN LOST AT THE BASES AND MY HAVE WOUND UP IN THE HANDS OF THE NPA. HE REFERRED IN PARTICULAR TO A REPORT OF ARMS FROM SUBIC BEING LANDED ON THE BATAAN PENINSULA IN JULY 1977. OUR SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES AT THE BASES (RADM KILCLINE AND MGEN POSTON) HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF SIGNIFICANT ARMS LOSSES. MARCOS SUGGESTED THAT ENRILE SHARE THE REPORTS WITH BASE AUTHORITIES AND THAT APPROPRIATE

INVESTIGATIONS BAOCONDUCTED. THE AMBASSADOR USED THE OCCASION TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING TOGETHER ON THE ISSUE OF PERIMETER SECURITY.

7. COMMENT. THE MARCOS ESPINO BRIEFING ON POTENTIAL THREATS TO THE PHILIPPINES IS RECOGNIZED AS SPECULATIVE AND VULNERABLE UNDER DETAILED ANALYSIS. HOWEVER, THE TREND OF EVENTS PORTRAYED IS REMOTELY POSSIBLE AND WE SHOULD ACCEPT THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED AS GENUINELY FELT.

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WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE JANUARY PRESENTATION OF OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SCENE MIGHT BROADEN GOP PERSPECTIVES. THIS MIGHT BEST BE DONE THROUGH GENERAL OBSERVATIONS RATHER THAN ANY EFFORT AT POINT BY POINT REFUTATION OF THE MARCOS/ESPINO BRIEFING (WE HAVE BEEN PROMISED FULL TEXT OF THE ASSESSMENT AND WILL CONVEY IT BY CABLE WHEN RECIEVED). TO INSURE THAT THE DISCUSSION PROCESS WITH MARCOS CONTINUES IN A FASHION BEST DESIGNED TO HOLD HIS INTEREST AND PARTICIPATION, WE MUST CONTINUE TO SHOW GENUINE AND TIMELY RESPONSIVENESS TO HIS CONCERNS AND PRIORITIES. AS A TOP PRIORITY ON OUR SIDE THE DELINEATED MAPS OF THE BASES WITH ACCOMPANYING COMMENTS ON THE ROLE OF THE PHILIPPINE BASE COMMANDER IN PERIMETER SECURITY (SUBJECT OF SEPTEL) SHOULD BE PASSED TO THE GOP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, HOPEFULLY BY DECEMBER 2 WHEN AMBASSADOR WILL SEE MARCOS AT TIME OF WEISNER CALL. WE MAY GET THE ENRILE LIST OF PRIORITIZED EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS WHEN WE PROVIDE THE MAPS. TO INSURE SIGNIFICANT PROCESSING OF THAT LIST BEFORE THE JANUARY CONSULTATIONS, WE WOULD HOPE THAT DOD COULD BEGIN NOW TO REVIEW THE FEASIBILITY OF HZIPING WITH THOSE ITEMS WE EXPECT TO SEE HIGH ON THE LIST; E.G. AIR DEFENSE RADAR, MISSILES FOR THE F-8H, MISSILES FOR THE PSSM PATROL BOATS, SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES, TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, HELICOPTERS, PATROL BOATS AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. WE WOULD HOPE THAT SURVEY TEAM COULD COME TO MANILA WITHIN FEW DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF LIST AND THAT ITS REVIEW WORK WOULD HAVE PROGRESSED BY TIME OF JANUARY CONSULTATIONS TO POINT THAT WE COULD DURING CONSULTATIONS PROVIDE INITIAL INDICATION OF ASSISTANCE PACKAGE WE SEE FEASIBLE.

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